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Peirce’s Reception in Australia and
New Zealand
Catherine Legg
1 An early Peirce enthusiast was Douglas Gasking, who taught from the mid-1940s to the
mid-1970s at University of Melbourne. Gasking was particularly interested in applying
Peircean  ideas  to  epistemology,  and  his  “Inductive  and  Deductive  Arguments”
(delivered at the NZ Division of the Australasian Association of Philosophy conference
in 1972) discusses Peirce’s famous bean-in-the-bag examples in detail. Gasking was also
an  early  noter  of  Peirce’s  influence  on  the  later  Wittgenstein  through  Ramsey  (in
“Wittgenstein’s  Influence”  which  alas  remains  unpublished).  The  introduction  to  a
posthumous Gasking anthology states, “In his last weeks Douglas was still reading his
beloved ‘Charlie Peirce’” (Gasking 1996, 13). Gasking’s interest in Peirce was furthered
at University of Melbourne through the 1970s and 1980s by his student Len O’Neill, who
consciously  entitled  his  long-running,  widely-esteemed  second-year  epistemology
course  “Philosophy  of  Inquiry,”  and  published  a  discussion  of  Peirce’s  claim  that
hypotheses that predict new (as opposed to known) data are more valuable (O’Neill
1993).
2 Meanwhile,  the  trail-blazing  New Zealand philosopher  Arthur  Prior,  who taught  at
University of Canterbury from the mid-1940s until in 1958 he departed for the UK, was
one of the first English-speaking logicians to appreciate the true scope and depth of
Peirce’s  logical  contribution.  The mere two published papers  which Prior  explicitly
dedicated  to  discussing  Peirce  (Prior  1958;  1964)  belie  his  wide  reading  in  Peirce’s
papers, which contributed much to the development of his innovative tense logic. In
particular, Prior saw his modal formalization of branching time as a way to work out
Peirce’s philosophical ideas on chance, necessity and human freedom.
3 Through the 1980s and 1990s Maurita Harney, who studied at University of Melbourne
before completing a PhD in philosophy of language at Australian National University,
took  a  pioneering  interest  in  Peirce’s  semiotics.  She  used  it  to  explore
phenomenological and hermeneutic approaches to philosophy of mind, language, and
computing,  and  put  it  to  innovative  use  teaching  philosophy  of  management  at
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Swinburne University of Technology. Most recently she has been contributing to the
emerging area of biosemiotics, drawing inspiration from Peirce and Merleau-Ponty.
4 The 1990s saw the emergence of  some dedicated Peirce scholars  in Australia:  Anne
Freadman, Professor of French at the Universities of Queensland and then Melbourne,
measured Peirce’s semiotics up against structuralist and post-structuralist thought in
her rich book (Freadman 2004). Music scholar Naomi Cumming became fascinated by
the application of Peirce’s semeiotics to the expression of personality in performance,
and published a fine book (Cumming 2000) before dying at the tragically young age of
38. Meanwhile Catherine Legg, studying realism with “hard-headed” Australian realists
at Australian National University,  became convinced that Peirce’s scholastic realism
could  very  usefully  open  up  debates  in  this  area,  completing  her  PhD on  Peirce’s
“Modes  of  Being”  and  since  publishing  a  number  of  further  papers  on  scholastic
realism  and  iconicity  (Legg  2008).  In  the  early  2000s  a  further  Peirce  scholar  was
imported from the UK by Macquarie University: Albert Atkin, who obtained his PhD
under Christopher Hookway and has subsequently published on Peircean philosophy of
language (Atkin 2008).
5 Through the mid-1990s to the present day, Australia has seen a modest flourishing of
what is now known as neo-pragmatism, mainly centered around University of Sydney
and the  Australian  philosophers  Huw Price  (who became interested  in  pragmatism
through anti-realist musings about time) and David Macarthur (who wrote a PhD on
pragmatism at Harvard under Hilary Putnam). This has led to some discussion of Peirce
as  part  of  broader  engagements  concerning  representationalism,  expressivism,
normativity and naturalism. Finally at  University of  Sydney one must also mention
Paul Redding, whose wide-ranging and impressively thorough work in the history of
modern philosophy, with particular focus on the 18th and 19th century figures of Kant
and Hegel, has inevitably led him to consider Peirce, most notably in Redding (2003).
6 Although I  think it  is  far  to say that  in what natives of  this  part  of  the world call
“downunder,” Peirce is still a minority interest, appreciation of his work appears to be
growing slowly but surely.
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